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Criminal Law. Whitaker v. State, 199 A.3d 1021 (R.I. 2019). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court made clear that the rule outlined in
the United States Supreme Court case Rosemond v. United States
does not apply retroactively.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 2006, Kendall Whitaker (Whitaker) was convicted of first
degree murder, first degree robbery, assault with a dangerous
weapon, carrying a handgun without a license, use of a firearm
during the commission of a violent crime, discharging a firearm in
the commission of a crime of violence, and committing a crime of
violence while armed and having available a firearm. 1 Prior to
these convictions, Whitaker and two friends, Brandon Robinson
(Robinson) and Richard Isom (Isom), attended a party at a friend’s
apartment. 2 After spending the beginning of the evening
socializing, Whitaker and some friends went into the hallway of the
apartment building, where Whitaker expressed his interest in
taking Joel Jackson’s (Jackson) gold chain.3 Upon re-entering the
party, Robinson and Jackson began to quarrel. 4 At trial, Corissa
Richardson (Richardson), also in attendance at the party, testified
that she saw Whitaker remove a gun from his jacket and point it
toward the scuffle. 5 Isom and Robinson also testified against
Whitaker at trial, recounting that Whitaker “drew his gun” after
returning to the apartment. 6 Shortly thereafter, three individuals
were shot, including Jackson, who later died of his injuries. 7 In
addition, Robinson testified that he took the chain and a medallion
1. Whitaker v. State, 199 A.3d 1021, 1024 (R.I. 2019); State v. Whitaker,
79 A.3d 795, 800 (R.I. 2013).
2. Whitaker, 199 A.3d at 1024.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1024–25.
6. Id. at 1025.
7. Id.
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that Jackson had been wearing. 8 Whitaker, Isom and Robinson
were later arrested.9
After Whitaker was convicted of the aforementioned crimes, he
filed a direct appeal with the Rhode Island Supreme Court (the
Court) alleging that there was insufficient evidence to support the
jury’s conclusion that he was guilty of aiding and abetting. 10 The
Court held that, based on the testimony of Robinson, Isom, and
Richardson, the jury had enough support to find Whitaker guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. 11
One year later, Whitaker filed an application for postconviction relief, claiming that the jury was wrongly instructed
pursuant to a newly decided United States Supreme Court case,
Rosemond v. United States. 12 Whitaker argued that in order to be
convicted under an aiding and abetting theory, the jury must find
that Whitaker “actively participated in the underlying violent crime
with advance knowledge that a confederate would use or carry a
gun during the commission of the crime.”13 Whitaker also alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object
to the jury instructions provided at trial.14 The hearing justice
granted his application, finding that the decision in Rosemond
applied to Whitaker’s case, and vacated several of his convictions. 15
The hearing justice also found that although Rosemond was decided
after Whitaker’s conviction, it should nonetheless apply
retroactively.16 Additionally, the trial justice held that in order to
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. State v. Whitaker, 79 A.3d 795, 805 (R.I. 2013). Whitaker argued that
there was insufficient evidence for him to be convicted of aiding and abetting
because the only evidence presented involved a conspiracy count for which
Whitaker had already been acquitted. Id.
11. Id. at 807.
12. Whitaker, 199 A.3d at 1025. The Supreme Court held in Rosemond
that for federal charges for using or carrying a firearm during and in relation
to any crime of violence or drug trafficking, criminal liability for that offense
on a theory of aiding and abetting requires the government to prove that the
defendant knew about the presence of the gun in advance and knowingly
participated in the criminal venture with the intent to aid an armed offense.
Id. at 1022.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1026.
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be convicted under an aiding and abetting theory by a
preponderance of the evidence, Whitaker had to have known of and
voluntarily participated in the crime; the hearing justice found he
did not do so.17 Finally, applying the requirements laid out in
Strickland v. Washington, 18 the hearing justice found that
Whitaker had successfully shown that his counsel’s performance
could not “be relied on as having produced a just result.” 19 The
State petitioned the Court for a writ of certiorari to review the lower
court’s grant of Whitaker’s application for post-conviction relief,
which the Court granted.20
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Court reviewed the trial justice’s decision to grant
Whitaker’s petition for post-conviction relief de novo, according
“great deference” to the hearing justice’s findings of fact. 21 The
Court first addressed the State’s argument that Whitaker’s trial
counsel was not deficient for not requesting a jury instruction based
on the ruling in Rosemond.22 The Court found that the ruling in
Rosemond does not apply retroactively for two reasons: (1)
Rosemond was decided nine years after Whitaker’s trial and (2) the
Supreme Court, in its holding, was silent on Rosemond’s retroactive
applicability. 23 Even if this rule were to apply retroactively,
however, the Court distinguished Whitaker’s case because he was
convicted pursuant to a Rhode Island law, where in Rosemond, a
federal statute applied.24 As the Court explained, the state and
federal statutes have different standards of liability for aiding and

17. Id.
18. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). The two
requirements used to determine whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process are: (1) evidence showing
counsel’s performance was so deficient that counsel did not function at the level
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and, (2) evidence that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. Id.
19. Whitaker, 199 A.3d at 1027.
20. Id. at 1026.
21. Id. at 1027.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1028.
24. Id. at 1029.
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abetting, 25 and because Whitaker was not convicted under the
federal statute, Rosemond did not apply. 26
Next, the court sought to determine Rosemond’s retroactive
applicability on collateral review. Looking to the United States
Supreme Court case Teague v. Lane, 27 where the Court held that
new rules regarding criminal prosecutions should be applied
retroactively to cases on collateral review, this Court held that the
ruling in Rosemond was not a new rule and therefore did not apply
retroactively.28 This Court defined a new rule as groundbreaking:
one that “imposes new obligation[s] on the States or the Federal
Government.” 29 Because the Rosemond court based its decision on
precedent, “it did not create a new rule that was to be retroactive to
cases on collateral review.” 30 Furthermore, the Court emphasized,
Rosemond applied to federal, not state law, which was not at
issue. 31
Finally, the Court reviewed whether Whitaker’s defense
counsel was so deficient in his performance as to “undermine[] the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot
be relied on as having produced a just result.” 32 The court again
reviewed whether Whitaker had “advance knowledge that a
weapon was going to be used,” relying on testimony given by
Jackson and Isom, which confirmed that Whitaker decided prior to
attending the gathering that he would bring a gun.33 The Court
explained that even if Rosemond applied to the case at bar, the
conviction would nonetheless stand because the defense’s reliance
on Rosemond was “misplaced.” 34

25. See id. at 1029–30 (discussing different standards for aiding and
abetting liability under Rhode Island law and federal law).
26. Id. at 1028–29.
27. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).
28. Whitaker, 199 A.3d at 1030.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1031.
31. Id. at 1029.
32. Id. at 1027.
33. Id. at 1031.
34. Id. at 1032. The Court relied on the case of Jimenez v. United States,
where the court held that Rosemond would only affect the outcome of a case if
the defendant did not carry a weapon himself. Id. (citing Jimenez v. United
States, 2015 WL 4507764, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2015)).
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Whitaker’s final challenge involved his trial counsel’s “failure
to raise a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to charge
Whitaker under an aiding-and-abetting theory.” 35 Upon review of
the record, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence
to convict Whitaker in light of the testimony provided by Robinson
and Isom.36 Accordingly, the Court held that Whitaker failed to
show that his trial counsel was deficient by a preponderance of the
evidence. 37
COMMENTARY
Although the Court concluded that Rosemond does not apply
retroactively, it nevertheless considered whether this rule would
apply to Whitaker’s case if it was found to apply retroactively. 38
The Court described how the Rosemond rule would not apply here
because Whitaker was convicted under state law, as opposed to
federal law. 39 Although the rule concerns federal law, the principle
articulated in Rosemond should apply to state law as well.40 The
fundamental principle underlying the crime of aiding and abetting
is the same in both federal and state law. Although the rule in
Rosemond does not apply retroactively, the Court incorrectly based
its inapplicability on the particular crime of aiding and abetting. 41
The Court attempts to explain the reasons why Rosemond did
not establish a new rule, basing this conclusion on the Rosemond
Court’s reliance on precedent. 42 The Supreme Court often relies on
precedent to craft new rules; for example, in Miranda v. Arizona,
the Court established a new rule regarding arrest procedures.43
The Supreme Court established this new rule while relying on
precedent cases that discussed procedural safeguards to protect an
individual’s right against self-incrimination. 44 Rosemond is no
different—the Supreme Court clearly crafted a new rule that was
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Whitaker, 199 A.3d at 1032.
Id. at 1033.
Id. at 1032.
Id. at 1030.
Id.
Id. at 1029.
Id.
Id. at 1030.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 503 (1966).
Id. at 498.
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based upon existing precedent.45 The Court sets a nearly
impossible standard for creating a new rule: the rule must be
“groundbreaking.” 46 The Court’s reliance on this standard is
misguided based on the reasoning in Miranda and cases like
Miranda that articulate new legal rules despite relying on
precedent. 47
CONCLUSION
Here, the Court established that the United States Supreme
Court, in its holding in Rosemond, did not intend its ruling to apply
retroactively. Rosemond was decided nine years after Whitaker’s
initial trial. 48 The Court highlights that when a ruling is meant to
be held retroactively, the result will not be based on precedent, but
establish a new rule itself. Because Rosemond was based on
precedent, the court holds that the case does not apply retroactively
and therefore does not apply to Whitaker’s case.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the United States
Supreme Court case Rosemond v. United States did not apply
retroactively, and in so holding, denied Whitaker’s request for postconviction relief. In addition, the Court found that under the United
States Supreme Court case Strickland v. Washington, defense
counsel was not insufficient. The Rhode Island Supreme Court
quashed the judgment granting post-conviction relief and
reinstated Whitaker’s full conviction from the lower court.
Olivia Handy

45.
46.
47.
48.

Whitaker, 199 A.3d at 1031.
Id. at 1030.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 503.
Whitaker, 199 A.3d at 1028.

